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Digital evidence; the standard of proof for
circumstantial evidence; it should lead one to
‘the irresistible inference and conclusion’ that
the offence was committed by the accused
Brief facts
The accused worked at an independent office at the
National Environment Agency North East Regional Office
(NEA NERO). He was co-leader of a sub-committee given
the task of organising a two day event during NEA’s
‘Clean & Green Week 2005’ (CGW 2005). On 18 October
2005 two false terrorist attack warning messages
(alarming messages) were sent through the web sites of
the Ministry of Home Affairs, the first of which read
‘Rumours of possible suicide bomb in Bedok area in 2 to
3 weeks time’ and the second of which read ‘a possible
bomb attack in Singapore in an event with water
activities involving head of state, ministers etc. Within a
month’. The third alarming message was sent through
the web site of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) on 19
October 2005, and read:
‘I would like to inform you of a plot to conduct suicide
bomb attack against PM, Ministers and MPs in a
major event in Bedok Reservoir area in the coming
weeks. The group mainly locals carrying out this
attack are trained by an unnamed Thai Muslim
fundamentalist group infamous for attacks against
government soldiers in Thailand. The group has
managed to infiltrate the National Environment
Agency top rank management through a converted
Thai Muslim who underwent Jihad training in Thailand
early this year. The attack is likely to be carried out
either by vessels loaded with explosives running into
the VIP tent at high speed or by bombs concealed in
drums, etc, used by performing groups. The attack is
at the final phase and all equipment are ready for
deployment. Please respond quickly’.
The alarming messages were communicated to the
respective recipients via the feedback function in web
sites, not by e-mail. Police investigations revealed that
the alarming messages had emanated from NEA’s
computer network. In particular, they had been sent
from the desktop computer located in the office (office
computer) in which the accused worked, and which had
been allocated for use by the accused.
The charges
The accused was served with three charges under
Regulation 8(1) of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism
Measures) Regulations, which are read with Section 5(1)
of the United Nations Act (Cap. 339) for sending false
terrorist attack warning messages.
Defence raised by the accused
The accused claimed the defence of alibi, and also
claimed that the e-mails were sent by an impostor who
had access to his office. He called a digital evidence
specialist to support his theory.
Defence of alibi
The accused claimed that on 18 and 19 October, on
account that he had been afflicted with diarrhoea, and
had gone home a number of times without informing
anyone at NEA NERO. The accused called his father and
wife as witness to corroborate his movement on the
dates in question.
Prosecution’s rebuttal of alibi defence
The prosecution’s case was that because the messages
in question were traced to the office computer, he was
the obvious culprit. If a finding of fact is made that the
accused sent work related e-mails during the same
period of time that the messages were uploaded on to
the web sites, then he must have been in his office at
times closely proximate to activities relating to the
sending of three alarming messages.
The digital evidence demonstrated that 29 minutes
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after the first alarming message was sent, the office
computer was used to log on to the accused’s account
through Lotus Notes. An e-mail was sent at 3:23 pm on
18 October 2005, and immediately afterwards the office
computer was used to surf the Ministry of Home Affairs
web site leading up to sending of the second alarming
message. Thereafter, after a gap of 24 minutes, the
office computer was used to log on to accused’s account
through Lotus Notes.
An e-mail was sent at 9:16 am on 19 October 2005.
Shortly thereafter, at 9:27 am, the computer was used
to search information at an on-line government directory
for the address of the recipient of the third alarming
message. At 9:29 am a work related e-mail was sent,
and around at the same time a file ‘PMO.doc’ was
created on the thumb drive (other names for thumb
drives include: flash drives, jump drives, pen drives, key
drives, and USB drives) of the accused, containing the e-
mail address for the PMO.
The timings of sending of the e-mails and logging into
the accused’s account contradicted the accused’s claim
that he was not in his office at the time the alarming
messages were sent.
The impostor theory
The accused claimed that some ‘impostor’ had entered
his office and sent the three alarming messages. He
also asserted that the six e-mails, which were relied on
by the prosecution as corroborating evidence, had not
been sent from his office computer. The accused
claimed that his Windows password was his previous
car license plate number, while his Lotus Notes
password was his National Registration Identity Card
(NRIC) number and had remained unchanged for past 10
years. He also claimed that he had recorded these two
passwords, together with other password for the
computer applications, on two pieces of paper and kept
them in plain view on his desk.
Prosecution’s case relating to the impostor theory 
The accused acknowledged during the cross
examination that it would be difficult for any impostor to
enter his office, without a high risk of detection, and
was unable to produce evidence that an unauthorised
person had gained unauthorised access to his office in
order to send three e-mails in question.
Initially, the accused admitted that he did not share
his thumb drive with anyone. A number of files were
recovered on the accused’s thumb drive: ‘PMO2.doc’,
‘_WRL002.tmp’ and ‘PMO.doc’, which were clearly
related to third alarming message, and implicated the
accused in the sending of the third alarming message. If
the accused was not engaged in his usual routine on 18
and 19 October 2005, then it would have been next to
impossible for any impostor to have sent those e-mails
and messages, because an impostor would not have
been able to predict his movements on the days in
question.
The defence digital evidence specialist
With regard to the e-mails produced by the prosecution
as corroborating evidence, the digital evidence
specialist for the defence confirmed and agreed that
there was no conclusive evidence to show that the e-
mails had been sent from the office computer, but is
was a possibility that the e-mails had been sent from
the office computer. The digital evidence specialist
stated that it was very likely that files attached to two e-
mails had been opened on the office computer, and at
least one attachment had been saved onto the hard disk
of the office computer. The accused testified that he did
no such thing. He claimed that he was on a field
inspection at the material time but he was unable to
substantiate this assertion.
The digital evidence specialist conceded that a
hyperlink (‘pmo_hq@pmo.gov.sg’), found in the file
PMO.doc, could have been copied from a government
directory web site. He did not dispute, however, that the
office computer had been used to obtain access to the
Public Service Directory Interactive Website at about
9.27 am (two minutes before the alarming message was
sent) on 19 October 2005.
The text of the third alarming message was found in
the thumb drive. The digital evidence specialist testified
that his examination of the various links and temporary
files that were relevant, revealed that it was possible
that the file PMO2.doc had been created on another
computer, saved on the thumb drive, and subsequently
transferred on to the office computer. However, he
conceded that it was also possible that the file was
created on the office computer and subsequently saved
on to the thumb drive.
Held
The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence and
the evidence in the statements of the accused to
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establish its case. Bala Reddy J quoted a decision of the
Court of Appeal respecting the test for the use of
circumstantial evidence, at 66, and further commented
in respect of the evidence in this case at 67:
66 The Court of Appeal followed the approach in Ang
Sunny v PP,1 and further
stated:
“The Sunny Ang test arose out of the following
direction the trial judge gave to the jury in his
summing-up at the close of the case:
“Now, as I told you earlier on, one of the points
about circumstantial evidence is its cumulative
effect. Any one of these points taken alone might,
you may think, be capable of explanation. The
question for you is: where does the totality of
them, the total effect of them, all lead you to?
Adding them together, considering them, not
merely each one in itself but altogether, does it or
does it not lead you to the irresistible inference
and conclusion that the accused committed this
crime? Or is there some other reasonably possible
explanation of those facts?”
The prosecution case is that the effect of all this
evidence drives you inevitably and inexorably to the
one conclusion and one conclusion only: that it was
the accused who intentionally caused the death of
this young girl.”
67 The thrust of the accused’s defence is that he did
not send the messages in question but an imposter
did. It is not for the accused to prove that an imposter
had in fact sent the messages. The burden to show
that it was the accused who had sent the messages
rests on the prosecution in order to establish the
charges beyond reasonable doubt.
The defence was not able to create any reasonable
doubt in this case. The judge found the imposter theory
incredible as there was no one with the motive to frame
the accused nor likely to have committed the acts
undetected given the high risk. Further, the imposter
must have had intimate knowledge of the accused’s
work process as well as of his involvement with the
CGW 2005 to compose the alarming messages. In short,
the learned judge found the evidence of the passwords
being written down as a lame attempt to substantiate
the ‘imposter’ theory.
The court concluded that the accused deliberately
sent three alarming messages, peppered with alarming
details of terror attack against the Prime Minister and
other leaders at a public event. The accused was
sentenced to 30 month’s imprisonment.
Comments 
This case serves as a reminder that digital evidence can
serve to both support and challenge the theory of a
case. The use of a defence that relies on a deficiency in
digital evidence may be countered by further digital
evidence, as well as other forms of evidence, such as
documentary proof and oral testimony. Bare assertions
rarely succeed, and the principles of relevancy and
weight remain applicable. Another observation that may
be made is that those responsible for collecting
evidence continue to develop skills and methodologies
in respect of digital evidence in order to counter every
possible defence and issue that may be raised.
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